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  This paper looks at changes in the corporate ownership network of Germany to 
evaluate the transformation of corporate governance and the impact of globalization. The 
German economy is an interesting and important case, as it has long been viewed as 
representing a prototype called “corporatism” or in more current parlance, the 
“coordinated market economy” (Hall and Soskice 2002).  This economy consists of a 
bundle of complementary institutions that permits a high-level equilibrium among 
corporatist actors: the state, unions, and firms.  The claim of complementarity implies 
that piecemeal change can dangerously undermine this equilibrium; changing one 
institution without changing all can lead to a precipitous decline in aggregate 
performance of the economy. 
The German corporate ownership structures grew out of the expansion of credit 
lending to investment banking by universal and regional banks (Fohlin, 1997).
1  Even if 
the origins of these networks provided few private or social externalities, the banks 
clearly played an important coordinating role.  In the era before World War II, 
competition between industrial companies was regulated via cartel agreements. 
There is evidence that at that time, banks exerted considerable pressure on defecting 
companies to persuade them to join a cartel (Pohl 1979).
2   
These early institutional formations have proven to be surprisingly enduring.  
Despite the introduction of anti-trust policy by the US occupied forces that broke up 
many of the large Konzerns, German corporate ownership networks continued to display 
a high degree of cross-holdings relative to other countries.  The enduring relationship 
between big German companies, with financial companies in the center of a network of 
                                                 
1 Germany experienced a large merger wave at the turn of the 1900s, which was smaller than that in the US 
but nevertheless resulted in highly diversified firms. See * and Kocka, 199 , for a discussion. 
2 However, many firms resisted bank intervention. See the studies by Weihoener, 19**. 2 
interlocking capital relations and directorates, was unquestionably the outcome of 
political negotiations in the reconstruction of Germany.   The federal and state 
governments promoted bank and insurance investments in industry.  To stabilize these 
investments, high capital gains taxes were incurred on the sale of block shares, while 
retained earnings were shielded through reserve provisions.   External monitoring of 
firms by boards was weak and, consequently, financial institutions played an important 
role in oversight.  The lack of economic and social accountability led to a gradual 
extension of co-determination that allowed employees and unions to participate in 
company policy. 
 Corporate governance law in Germany changed dramatically in the 1990s.  
Corporate control through cross-holdings was lessened through the adoption of “one 
share, one vote” restrictions.  The major universal banks moved rapidly into investment 
banking and, partly in order to avoid conflicts of interest, shed many of their board ties to 
industrial firms.  The new corporate tax laws eliminated capital gains on sales of share 
blocks, thus promoting restructuring. In all, there was a movement toward the Anglo-
American model of shareholder and corporate governance. 
  The impact of these changes on the traditional ties among German financial and 
industrial firms is highly contested.
3  However, there is little doubt that viewed 
individually, many Germany firms and banks have sought to re-position themselves while 
utilizing the discourse of shareholder capitalism.  Globalization proceeds in other words 
on the back of domestic strategies. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Heinze, 2001, the comments of Hoepner and Jackson, 2002, and Heinze’s (2002) 
response. 3 
  However, restructuring need not lead to a disintegration of the historic properties 
of the ownership network.  As found by Kogut and Walker (2001), restructuring 
reinforces the network when the sales of shares are conducted among “friends”, as had 
been the case in Germany through the mid-1990s.  If there is private value in local 
neighborhoods (as defined by ownership relationships), then we should see actors 
strategizing to respond to the impact of institutional changes by attempting willy-nilly to 
preserve the substance of these ties. 
  These observations raise the interesting issue of who cooperates and who defects 
from the task of preserving the network.  Is there a fifth column that can be identified by 
individual attributes (such as profitability) or by structural properties in an ownership 
network (e.g. centrality)?
4  We offer below an initial empirical assessment of this 
question by predicting the number of transactions in which a firm engages during the 
1990s.  
Institutional background: 
  As described above, the evolution of Germany ownership and board ties resulted 
in a high degree of coordination.  The cross-holdings resulted in a pattern by which many 
firms were controlled by other firms (Konzernierung); boards and capital ties were highly 
related; and dense personal relationships that accompanied the business relationships 
(Beyer and Hoepner, 2003).  The consequence was that Germany evidenced higher 
density (i.e. the number of ties over the theoretical maximum) than any other industrial 
country (Windolf and Beyer, 1996).  Financial companies, particularly Deutsche Bank, 
Dresdner Bank, Allianz and Münchener Rückversicherung, played central roles in these 
                                                 
4 The fifth column originates from the Spanish Civil War in which pro-Franco forces inside a city held by 
the Nationalists would aid the external attack; the term also serves as a title to a Hemingway play about the 
war.  4 
networks (often in their capacities as “Hausbank”) and were themselves financially tied.  
At the regional level, regional governments were shareholders, including in such 
dominant banks as Bayerische LB and West LB (using their current names).  These ties 
lead to an active cooperation between the banks and regional industrial policy that dates 
back at least as far as the Weimar Republic (Herrigel, 1996).    
  Not surprisingly, German capitalism was frequently challenged by both labor and 
liberal parties.  One can almost trace a twenty year cycle in the major state commissions 
that reviewed monopoly power among banks starting in the early 1900s (allowing for an 
interruption of the war and early reconstruction).
5  Beyer (2003) reports: Whereas in 
1963, a total of 636 joint stock companies were traded on the stock exchange, by 1973 
this figure had decreased to 494 and by 1983 to a mere 436. Starting in the 1980s, a 
number of reforms were introduced to strengthen stock markets, including a 1986 
reorganization of the stock market.  These changes are perceptible in the increase in listed 
companies.  Beyer and Hoepner (2003) note that only 436 German companies had been 
listed in 1983, but at the end of the 1990s their number had risen to 933.
6  
  The growth in stock exchange listings was coupled belatedly with changes in 
corporate governance regulation under the Corporate Sector Supervision and 
Transparency Act that was adopted through the insistence of the Liberal Party that was 
needed to form a conservative government.  This law broke with the long-time tradition 
of the firm as representing the social interests in favor of a shareholder corporate 
governance law.  In addition, the decision of the labor government to eliminate capital 
gains tax, and yet allow cross-holdings, encourages the restructuring of ownership 
                                                 
5 Riesser, 1907; 1930, Enquete; Monopolkomission, 1977; Eichel review, 199*) 
6 Franks and Mayer (2001) report fewer than 800 companies in 1991.  5 
through the sales of share blocks.  These changes are associated with what appears to be 
fundamental transformation in the German corporate economy. 
Changes in Corporatist Germany: 
  There is considerable evidence that corporate and corporatist Germany is rapidly 
changing.  The economic performance of Germany has been one of the worse in Europe 
in recent years.  Concomitant with this decline has been the disintegration of many 
historical ties among firms.  Notably, banks are selling block shares in companies and 
also withdrawing from many boards.   In a review of these events, Beyer and Hoepner 
(2003) report that board interlocks declined among the largest 100 firms from 12 percent 
of all possible interlocks to less than 7 percent by 1998.  Between 1996 and 1998, the 
number of capital ties between the 100 biggest German companies declined from 169 to 
108.  Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank moved from the center to a more peripheral 
network position, and Deutsche Bank has announced it will withdraw from all boards. 
  It is useful to recall that similar transformations in corporate networks have 
occurred in other countries.  The Davis and Mizruchi (1999) study found similar levels of 
board interlocks among the largest American firms for the mid 1990s.  However, banks 
dropped dramatically in centrality from 1982 to 1994; only two banks played a central 
role in the corporate network compared to 10 in the earlier period.
7 
  The German and American comparison also shares the similarity regarding the 
impact of changes in tax law on restructuring.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is credited 
with the restructuring of US industry, as well as influencing the corporate form (Zey and 
Swenson, 1999).  Similarly, preemptive restructuring in the past few years in Germany is 
                                                 
7 It is of interest to note that at a regional level, American banks continued to show a high degree of board 
representation. The decline is at the national level, not at the local level (Friedland and Palmer, 1994). 6 
attributed to the anticipatory effects of the “Eichel Plan” that removes capital gains tax on 
corporate restructuring. 
  These changes raise profound questions regarding the impact of restructuring on 
coordination among key corporatist actors.  It is interesting that no corporatist actor, in 
fact, came forward to rescue “Deutschland A.G.”.  The unions had long been critical of 
the collusive implications of these links.  The Federal government also viewed these links 
skeptically.  By the mid-1990s, corporate Germany also appeared to defect from its 
historical position.  According to Beyer and Hoepner (2003), the smoking gun is the 
growth of investment banking as a primary engine of profitability for the troubled 
German banks.  Due to supposed conflicts of interests (especially in the area of hostile 
takeovers), the major German banks withdrew from many boards and sold shares in 
companies.   
This characterization of an epochal change in corporate governance echoes Mark 
Roe’s point on the emergence of systems of governance (Roe, 1994).  He argues that 
there are essentially critical moments in which the institutions are reset, the rules are 
changed, and consequently a pattern of governance emerges over time.  Germany, by the 
above evidence, appears to be facing a massive political shift away from Sozialwirtschaft 
policy of risk-sharing between banks, corporations, and society toward a market-driven 
economy. 
  How one views these changes (the extent of which we will assess below) is 
dependent upon the judgment of the supposed benefits of corporatist Germany in the first 
place.  The evidence in fact is very mixed.  Fohlin (1997, 1999) analyzed the effects of 
bank interlocks with corporations in the period prior to World War I and found little 7 
evidence that these ties increased liquidity or investment to client companies. She 
concludes the ties served to expand the investment banking business of the banks.  For a 
more recent historical period, Gorton and Schmid (2000) found evidence that banks 
provided value to affiliated companies prior to the 1980s, but these premia evaporated in 
later years.  Edwards and Frank (1998) dismiss the benefits of board representation, 
noting that, in fact, supervisory boards provide very weak governance. 
  The study of Franks and Mayer (2001) casts an especially negative light on the 
overall implications of cross-holdings for the period of 1988 to 1991.  They note 
interestingly that Germany shows an unusually high degree of share block sales.  While 
mergers and acquisitions are only 50% of the UK level, the value of block sales adds 
another 50%. In effect, ownership changes are about at the same magnitude as in the UK.  
Of a sample of 171 firms, they found that control was leveraged through pyramid 
schemes (that Berle and Means analyzed in their 1934 study of American corporate 
ownership). Allianz, an insurance company now owned by Dresdner Bank, was a 
participant in 12 of the 33 pyramids.  In 23 of these companies, the ratio of voting rights 
to cash flow rights was greater than one, violating the “one share-one vote” principle 
adopted by the European Union.  Not surprisingly, Franks and Mayer found that transfers 
of ownership benefited holders of large blocks, but not minority shareholders. 
  The above studies suggest that the social benefits of the German corporate system 
have, at best, eroded substantially over the past few decades.  This outcome perhaps is 
not surprising given that Germany evidenced a violation of a basic complementarity in 
financial markets: the co-existence of dominant shareholders and weak protection of 8 
minority shareholders.
8  However, this violation is not unique to the German case and 
appears not to induce the same degree of agency problems.  Thus, a thoughtful study on 
the Swedish governance system and dominant owners could not explain why minority 
investors should exist (as they do massively) given that legal protections are weak and 
dominant shareholders powerful.  They conclude: 
We believe that significant control benefits, which are provided and protected by 
the corporate law, but restrained by informal social constraints has been one of the 
pivotal elements of the Swedish corporate governance model (Agnblad, et al, 
2003).  
 
Rich historical studies show that such governance is often regionally bound, with thick 
ties between firms, finance, labor, and the state (Herrigel, 1996; Ziegler, 2000).   The 
implication of this perspective is that social goods are provided on the basis of “locality”.  
National actors may emerge from these regions, but they bridge among clustered regions 
that engage in a high level of coordination. 
  There are, in summary, two interpretations of the social implications of network.  
The first stresses this corporatist line of thinking in which clustered networks produce a 
generalized reciprocity.  The second views these claims skeptically, emphasizing instead 
the agency problems inherent in financial markets with dominant shareholders and weak 
minority right provisions.  It is possible that the two views are consistent with the data, 
with the switch between a positive and negative externality network driven by exogenous 
forces, such as cultural change.   
  One possible exogenous factor is globalization.  However, globalization is by and 
large a smoke screen for the strategies pursued by domestic actors.  There is no doubt that 
                                                 
8 However, this observation should be modified by recalling two compensating features of the German 
system: a share of 25% constitutes a veto right and individual shareholders can challenge major corporate 
decisions, such as mergers. See Franks and Mayer, 2001, for a discussion of several cases. 9 
globalization has influenced Germany; increasingly the managerial discourse of 
shareholder value has permeated German companies and financial reports (Hoepner and 
Jackson, 2002).  However, this discourse legitimates the strategies of actors who, by the 
traditional standard, have chosen to defect from their institutional roles.  In this wider 
sense, globalization proceeds through the strategies of a fifth column. 
  The coherence of national systems depends then on the resistance of actors to the 
sirens of a new institutional order.  In an earlier work, we argued that the German 
corporate ownership network was unlikely to undergo radical change (Kogut and Walker, 
2001).  The emphasis on the number of links overestimates the vulnerability of the 
system, because many links are redundant.   Statistically, we showed that Germany is a 
small world that is characterized by short path lengths among firms (i.e. the average 
number of ownership links that separate any two firms) and high clustering values (i.e. 
the proportion of firms whom are tied via common owners to a given firm).  Moreover, 
we showed two other properties: that acquisitions tended to be mediated by highly central 
firms in these ownership chains and that, through simulations, the random “rewiring” of 
ownership ties did not dramatically decay these small world properties. 
  The studies cited above neglect these structural properties of a network.  
However, if the value of a network of cross-holdings is to channel information as well as 
to offer the opportunities to acquire ownership rights, then the important statistics are not 
simply how many ties but how cohesive are the ties and to whom are firms connected.  
The degree of cohesion is the property that should capture the externalities –if they 
should exist—in a neighborhood.  10 
We hypothesize that the inclination of firms to engage in restructuring (as 
measured by the number of mergers and acquisitions events in which they are engaged) is 
related to the structural properties of the network.  Recall that firms are connected 
through what is called a “bipartite graph”, that is, an affiliation matrix that links firms 
through owners.  By analyzing these chains, we measure the structural properties of a 
network by looking at the centrality of a firm’s owners in the network of German 
ownership ties.   (In future, we will look more directly at who defects.) 
Data: 
  German Firms and Owners. The time frame for this study is from 1993 to 2000.  
We measured German ownership relationships in 1993 and again in 1998. Acquisition 
events were observed from 1994 to 2000. We used the 1993 network to predict events 
from 1994 to 1997, and the 1998 network to predict events in 1999 and 2000.  
The data used in this analysis come from a handbook compiled by the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH., which gives broad financial data on the top industrial, 
financial, and insurance companies in Germany.  These companies include public stock 
companies (Aktiengesellschaft), limited liability companies (Gesellschaft mit 
beschraenkter Haftung), and limited partnerships.  In addition to financial data, the 
handbook reports also owners of record, even if their holdings are quite small (<5%).  
This information was derived from public financial statements and filings with 
government offices.  The cutoff for reporting owners follows German reporting 
standards. 
To reduce the complexity and scale of the analysis without necessarily reducing 
its substantive importance, we examined the largest 500 non-financial corporations, the 11 
25 largest banks and the 25 largest insurance firms, as of 1993 reports.  For 1998 we 
examined the 500 largest firms, the 50 largest banks and 50 largest insurance companies. 
This modest narrowing of the available data produced a sample of 550 firms for 1993 and 
600 firms for 1998 that could be engaged in some form of M & A activity.  The firms in 
1993 were owned by 520 institutions of some form, including other non-financial 
corporations, banks, insurance companies, cooperative organizations, families, state 
governments, the German national government, and non-German firms. For 1998, the 
number of shareholders was 574. Anonymous individual shareholders were excluded 
from the analysis. 
  An important decision is the treatment of holding companies, a relatively common 
form of institutional owner.  This form is far more prevalent in Germany than in other 
industrial countries, including France (see Kogut, Walker, and Anand, 2002).  Holding 
companies raise the problem of how to treat affiliated firms that are listed as companies 
but belong to a holding company structure.  We adopted the practice used in the 
handbook of recording a firm as owned by the holding company, along with other owners 
if it was a joint venture or less than fully-owned entity.  
Restructuring Events. The data on restructuring events come from the Securities 
Data Corporation archive on mergers and acquisitions.  From 1994 to 1997, there were 
101 acquisitions involving the top 550 German corporations, banks and insurance 
companies, on both side of the transaction.  There were obviously a much larger number 
of transactions involving these firms and smaller firms; however, we are not concerned 
with these events in this study.  The acquisitions we examine are either purchases of an 
entire corporation, of a corporation's subsidiary, or of a joint venture in which a large 12 
firm held a stake. We do not differentiate among these types of acquisition, since each of 
them entails the same questions about the influence of ownership chains. For the period 
1999-2000, there were 106 restructuring events.   
Firm variables. The handbook also provides data on the firm’s number of 
employees, the region (land) in which the firm is domiciled, the SIC codes of its 
businesses, and if it is a public firm, its profits, revenues and capital resources.  
Methods: 
  Constructing the Network of Ownership Ties. An ownership tie consists of a 
linkage between two firms through a common owner.  These ties for all the firms in our 
sample compose an affiliation network.  (See Wasserman and Faust 1994: Chapter 8, for 
a discussion and listing of previous studies of this kind.)  Analyzing such networks has a 
broad tradition and differs slightly from the more commonly studied relational networks 
that indicate direct ties between actors.  The ownership network among the 550 German 
firms for 1993 (600 for 1998) is simply the affiliation matrix among them.  In many 
ownership networks such as ours not all firms will be connected.  It should also be clear 
that firms can be linked by more than one owner. In our method, multiple common 
owners still result in a tie of one between two firms.  
Using the affiliation network, we constructed a distance matrix among the firms. 
The distance between two firms is the smallest number of owners linking them. Thus if 
companies A and B share an owner and companies B and C share an owner, the distance 
between A and B is two.  
Network variables – clustering, path length and centrality.  13 
The degree of clustering is indicated by a clustering coefficient.  This coefficient 
represents the extent to which firms that are directly connected to a focal firm are also 
directly connected to each other.  It is calculated by observing, for each firm, how many 
of the firms that are tied to it are also tied to each other and dividing this number by the 
number of possible ties in this set.  For example, if Daimler Chrysler is connected to ten 
other firms by one ownership link and eight of these firms are also directly tied to each 
other, then the Ci for Daimler would be 28 (the number of pairwise ties between the eight 
firms) divided by 45 (the number of possible ties among all ten firms in Daimler's set) or 
.62.  The average Ci for all the firms is then the network clustering coefficient. 
For the small world calculations, we need to estimate also the empirical path 
length and normalize both length and the clustering value.  In statistics, we calculate the 
significance of a coefficient by comparing it against something. A good example is the t 
or z test, in which we know the value of the observation, we subtract the mean from it, 
and we standardize by error. We can’t do this for networks in most cases, because we 
don’t know the true topology. Different topologies will have different distributions. And 
there is no equivalence to the central limit theorem that says no matter the topology, we 
get convergence to something we understand, if the number of nodes is large enough. 
The reason why the small world techniques are important is that we can now 
normalize clustering or path lengths in order to permit comparisons.  An empirical or 
simulated network is measured against a random graph, that is, what should we expect to 
find randomly if the world consists of n firms and k ownership links among them.  For a 
random graph, we expect the clustering coefficient to tend towards the value of k/n, 
where k is the number of links and n is the number of nodes.  The expectation for the path 14 
length is ln(n)/ln(k).   We use these random expectations to normalize our empirical 
estimates of path length and clustering coefficient. A small world is then characterized as 
a short standardized path length and a high standardized clustering value. 
A firm’s centrality in the ownership network is measured by calculating how 
many links between other firms it lies on. This measure, called betweenness, captures the 
extent to which a firm “brokers” relationships in the network. The relevant links for 
calculating betweenness are the shortest paths between other firms; these paths are called 
geodesics. To derive a firm’s betweenness score, let bjk be the proportion of all geodesics 
linking firm j and firm k on which firm i lies.  The betweenness of firm i is the sum of all 
bjk. To normalize betweenness in order to account for the size of the network, the 
betweenness score for a firm is divided by the maximum possible betweenness in the 
network (see Freeman, 1977).   
Predicting restructuring eEvents  
To predict the number of events a firm is involved in, we use negative binomial 
regression corrected with Huber-White-Sandwich technique. This technique recalculates 
the residuals to account for lack of independence among the observations. This correction 
is advisable since many German firms are involved in more than one event and are 
repeated across the 1993 and 1998 panels.  
Descriptives: 
  
  Descriptive data on the German firms and their owners in 1993 and 1998 are 
shown in Tables 1 through 6. Table 1 presents the potentially surprising fact that the 
modal ownership percentage is between 90 and 100%. Logically, the next most prevalent 
percentage is between 0 and 10%. 1993 and 1998 differ very little in this pattern. 15 
Consistent with this fact, Table 2 shows that most firms have one or two owners. Table 3 
shows the distribution of firms across regions within Germany, which differ very little 
across the two time periods. Table 4 presents the size distributions of the firms in 1993 
and 1998. Here there is a striking difference between 1993 and 1998 in that, where firms 
in the first period seem to approximate the standard lognormal size distribution, firms in 
the latter period do not. In 1998 there is a markedly higher number of smaller firms, 
indicating a potential increase in viable niche markets. Table 3 shows that the 
preponderance of firms were located in the manufacturing sector (SIC 3) and in 
information and financial services (SIC 5). Again, the patterns of 1993 and 1998 vary 
hardly at all with the exception of the rise in education and health care companies (SIC 6) 
in 1998.   
Small World Estimates: 
 
To position the structure of the German ownership network in the context of 
similar country networks, we report below on the findings from a larger project that 
examines small worlds in ownership networks in developed nations.  These teams are 
Gerry Davis and Mina Yoo (2002), United States; Sea-Jin Chang and Dukjin Chang 
(2002), Korea; and Raffaele Corrado and Maurizio Zollo (2002), Italy. 
 
Small World Estimates for Four Countries 
  Normalized  Normalized 
Small 
World 
 
Path 
Length 
Cluster 
Coef.  Estimates 
German firms 1993  1.87  38.18  22.46 
German Owners 
1993  1.18  118.50  100.48 
German firms 1998  1.08  95.00  87.96 
German Owners 
1998  0.91  176.00  193.41 
Samsung 1996  1.05  1.00  1.05 
Samsung 2000  1.01  1.00  1.05 16 
Italian firms 1990  1.39  5.06  3.65 
Italian owners 1990  1.27  20.43  16.12 
Italian firms 2000  1.30  6.94  5.33 
Italian owners 2000  1.32  21.04  15.93 
US owners 1990  1.49  9.68  6.49 
US owners 2001  1.42  3.81  2.67 
US Directors 1990  1.43  293.33  204.87 
US Directors 2001  1.45  440.00  303.07 
 
A few observations can be made on the statistics alone without recourse to the 
country histories.  Obviously, the German case is extraordinary. Its firms and owners are 
highly connected.  But Germany is also more fragmented than revealed by the statistics, 
consisting of a number of separate clusters of firms and owners.   
Italy is in many ways very similar. Corrado and Zollo explain that during the 
1990s, the Italian state de-regulated and privatized massively. Yet, there was little change 
in the properties of the firm or ownership networks.  As in the German case, the owner 
network shows more of a small world than the firm network, indicating a fairly tight-knit 
association among investors. 
Korea is at the other extreme.  There are no cross-holdings among the Chaebol, so 
the parameters can only be estimated for each Chaebol alone.  Samsung is chosen as the 
larger of the Chaebols, but its estimates are roughly representative for the others.  Korea 
is clearly not a small world in terms of ownership in the aggregate, and even within a 
Chaebol, ownership is not important.  The efforts to restructure Korea have not 
influenced its fundamental ownership patterns. 
The United States is the surprise among the studies.  In a time of globalization 
that is defined as convergence towards the American model, the United States ownership 
network is revealed to be highly connected.  Davis and Yoo calculate the percentage of 
firms belonging to the largest component (the largest connected sub-graph).    This 17 
percentage grew from 30% to 60% from 1990 to 2001.  The change is due to the growing 
concentration of ownership in the portfolios of institutional investors.  Even when an 
ownership cutoff of 10% is used, institutional investors (particularly Fidelity, Axa, and 
Wellington) still maintain sufficient levels of investment to create a main component 
consisting of one-fourth of all the largest firms in the U.S.; on average, these firms are 
less than two degrees away (1.68) from each other. 
  The comparison of Germany with the other countries is striking, revealing a far 
more knitted ownership structure than other industrialized countries.  It could well be that 
countries find functional equivalents, such as the highly structured American board 
networks.  Though we do not have comparable data for Germany, the degree of density is 
about the same for the US and Germany (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999; Beyer and Hoepner, 
2003).  There is some evidence that such connections matter for acquisition behavior in 
the US (Haunschild, 1993).  Lacking such data on board interlocks, we will focus our 
analysis below on the relationship of the firm and owner network properties and 
acquisitions. 
Results: 
  Table 6 shows the results from predicting firm involvement in a restructuring 
event. Firm size in employees consistently and strongly influences involvement, as does 
the firm’s net profits, but not revenue. Also, both regions and industries are highly 
significant differentiators of firms active in restructuring, as expected. 
 Note that we do not specify whether the firm is a buyer or target in these runs. 
One of the problems in differentiating between the two sides of the event here is that 
many events involve the sale of a unit, in which case the target can logically be larger 18 
than the acquirer and more or less profitable. We leave fine tuning of our model 
suggested by the separation of targets and acquirers to further steps.    
  Most important are the findings for firm clustering and owner centrality. 
Clustering is never significant, indicating that there is no indirect effect of the immediate 
ownership neighborhood on the incidence of an event. However, owner centrality 
consistently increases the likelihood of restructuring. Being owned by a dominant owner, 
in network terms, therefore raises the probability of buying or selling business units.  
Interestingly, owner centrality influences firm restructuring in both 1993 and 1998, but 
not to the same degree. The effect significantly declines over the decade  (Χ
2 = 14.73, p 
<.0001).  
  Table 7 shows the most central owners in 1993 and 1998. Roughly half of the 
dominant owners in 1993 remain so in 1998, and roughly half of these are the traditional 
large financial institutions – Allianz, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, and Dresdner Bank. 
Four of the newly central owners are German states – Bavaria, Baden Wurttemburg, 
North Rhine – Westphalia, and Lower Saxony – four of the five top regions measured in 
terms of corporate offices. The emerging relationship between restructuring and 
geography in Germany thus entails location as both domicile and shareholder. 
Conclusions:  
Recent German history reveals a pattern of correlated events: globalization, 
institutional changes -especially in the sphere of corporate taxation and corporate 
governance law - and restructuring of capital ties.  The reduction of holdings by 
particularly prominent financial institutions reinforces the inference that a kind of 19 
percolation threshold has been passed.  These trends point to a disintegration of the 
German ownership network. 
However, an analysis of the German corporate network does not support these 
broad claims.  In part, our analysis may differ because our sample of the largest firms is 
larger than that found in other studies.  But the primary difference lies in methodology: 
we compare the network properties over time and we relate restructuring decisions to 
these properties.  What our results indicate is the persistence of network structure in the 
sense of a small world of firms connected by owners.  In some ways, this confirms the 
contention that corporate governance is lodged in fairly stable and path dependent 
relationships (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999).   
The interesting question is why, when looking at these relationships at the micro-
level, firms would persist in these patterns.  We find that profitability itself is a predictor 
of the willingness of firms to participate in restructuring events.  But in addition, 
restructuring is predicted by the extent to which firms belong to a neighborhood where 
central owners act to reshape the corporate ownership network.  In this more micro 
analysis, we find in fact that there are significant changes over the 1990’s in the roles of 
central actors, including financial institutions: Central owners no longer play an 
important role in providing the externalities (either of information or of coordinating) by 
1998. Interestingly, the regions - both as owners and as a location of corporate 
headquarters - continue to play their historical role. 
These results are preliminary and do not address the interesting question of who 
defects from local ownership clusters.  This analysis awaits a more fine grain collection 
of financial data and of event data (i.e. share block sales).  However, the results suggest 20 
that the analysis of these micro decisions must be consistent with a sort of equilibrium 
constraint, namely, the persistence of the German network’s structural properties. 
If these results hold, they cast light on the efficacy and limitations of corporate 
law as a determinate of corporate governance.  The importance of law to corporate 
governance has been emphasized in particular by La Porta and his colleagues (La Porta et 
al., 1998, 2000) who find a relationship between financial market development and legal 
protections of minority shareholders.  It seems likely that changes in the corporate 
governance and tax code have influenced the strategies of firms.  These changes echo 
Davis and Mizruchi (1999) regarding the decline of American bank centrality.   
However, the persistence in the overall network structure of ownership suggests 
that the macroeconomic properties may be less troubled by these changes.  Much as the 
centrality of banks passed to institutional investors in the US (Davis and Yoo, 2002), a 
similar transition may be in place in the German context.  If so, these results would 
indicate that the efficacy of law is complex and highly dependent upon the ownership and 
economic relations embedded in fairly durable corporate networks. 
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Table 3
Numbers of Firms in German Regions
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Code Region 
1 Baden  -  Wurttemberg 
2 Bavaria 
3 Berlin 
4 Brandenburg 
5 Bremen 
6 Hamburg 
7 Hessen 
8  Mecklenburg - W. Pomerania 
9 Lower  Saxony 
10  North Rhine - Westphalia 
11 Rhineland  Palatinate 
12 Saarland 
13 Saxony 
14  Saxony - Anhalt 
15 Schleswig-Holstein 
16 Thuringia 
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Table 4
(Log) Size Distribution of Firms
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Table 6 
Negative Binomial Regressions  
Predicting Participation by Firms in Restructuring Events 
 
 
Model 4 
(log) employees  .202** 
(.063) 
Net profits  .00044** 
(.00017) 
Revenues -.000002 
(.000008) 
Region   1102.94*** 
df 12 
Industry (2-
digit) 
3437.46*** 
df 68 
Clustering -.227 
(.221) 
(Max) owner 
portfolio size 
-.034 
(.023) 
(Max) owner 
centrality – 93 
12.089*** 
(3.21) 
(Max) owner 
centrality – 98 
5.37** 
(2.49) 
Constant 13.42*** 
(1.28) 
Log-likelihood -508.18 
N 738 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Count of Restructuring events involving a firm 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
(log) employees  .28*** 
 (.059) 
(log) employees  .232 ***  
(.062) 
(log) employees  .22*** 
(.063) 
Net profits  .00038** (.00013)  Net profits  .0003**  
(.0001) 
Net profits  .00028**  
(.00014) 
Revenues -.000001 
 (.000005) 
Revenues -.000009   
(.00007) 
Revenues -.000003 
(.00007) 
Constant -3.47***   
(.543) 
Region   1396.81*** 
12 df 
Region 3483.98 
df 12 
   Industry  (2-digit)  6416.07*** 
66 df 
Industry (2-digit)  3260.19*** 
66 df 
   Constant  -1.54*** 
 (.68) 
Clustering -.288 
(.213) 
        (Max) owner portfolio size  .0015 
(.021) 
       (Max)  owner  centrality  4.76** 
(2.39) 
       Constant  13.34*** 
(3.01) 
Log-likelihood -572.03    -522.97    -515.36 
N 738   738    738 28 
Table 7 
 
Top Twenty Owners  - Centrality 
1993 1998 
Rank Owner Rank Owner 
1  Deutsche Bank AG  1  VEBA AG 
2 West  LB  Group  2 Allianz  group 
3 Allianz  group  3 Region  of  Bavaria 
4 VEBA  AG  4 Münchener  Rückversicherungs-AG 
5 RWE  AG  5 RWE  AG 
6  Dresdner Bank AG  6  Deutsche Bank AG 
7  VIAG AG  7  Region of Baden - Wurttemberg 
8 Wintershall  AG  8 VIAG  AG 
9  AGIV AG  9  Dresdner Bank AG 
10 Rütgerswerke  AG  10 Mannesmann  AG 
11  Thyssen Krupp Group  11  DG Bank 
12  Lahmeyer AG für Energiewirtschaft 12  West  LB  Group 
13 DG  Bank  13 Commerzbank  AG 
14 Technische  Werke  14 Thyssen  Krupp  Group 
15 Bayernwerk  AG  15 DaimlerChrysler  AG 
16 Bayerische  Landesbank  Girozentrale  16 Mobil  Petroleum 
17  Deutsche Bahn AG  17  Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG 
18 Mobil  Petroleum  18 Region  of  Lower  Saxony 
19  Commerzbank AG  19  Region of North Rhine - Westphalia 
20 Vermo  Vermögensverwaltung  GmbH  20 RAG  AG 
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